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Abstract
I will try to show how the present laws of war might be viewed as consistent with the Au-
gustinian just war tradition. The modern international legal regime, codified in the Charter of the
United Nations (”U.N. Charter”), permits States to engage in war only in “individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations;” or pursuant to a
determination by the U.N. Security Council of ”existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression,” and Security Council authorization of the use of force ”to maintain
or restore international peace and security.” Thus, modern international law would seem to fore-
close preemptive wars in advance of armed attack and humanitarian interventions lacking Security
Council authorizations. Although just war theorists have argued the morality of limited subsets
of both sorts of formally unlawful wars, Professor Elshtain’s concern in her lecture, and mine in
this Essay, is with humanitarian interventions that are seemingly unlawful under the U.N. Charter
regume, for instance, because of a lack of Security Council preauthorization.
THE AUGUSTINIAN JUST WAR TRADITION
AND THE PROBLEM OF PRETEXT IN
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION*
Thomas H. Lee**
I come to the subject matter of Professor Elshtain's lecture
as a lawyer, not as an ethicist, a philosopher, or a theologian.
Although I have some formal training in political theory, my
work in this area focuses principally on the laws of war, not the
moral concept of the just war. (Of course, as I have discovered
in teaching and writing on the laws of war, it is virtually impossi-
ble to separate altogether legality and morality on the subject.)
A consequence of this difference in approach may be a more
hospitable view of the existing international laws of war gov-
erning the resort to armed force.'
I would like to defend the laws, however, on Professor
Elshtain's own terms. That is to say, I will not challenge at the
start her assumption of undue restrictiveness in the current laws
governing the use of armed force in international affairs - her
implicit claim that the existing laws forbid wars that are moral
under the Christian just war tradition. Nor will I engage in a
defense of what she presumes those laws to be by reference to
lawyerly arguments or explanations grounded in international-
relations theory. Rather, I will try to show how the present laws
of war might be viewed as consistent with the Augustinian just
war tradition.
The modern international legal regime, codified in the
Charter of the United Nations ("U.N. Charter"), permits States
to engage in war only in "individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na-
* Originally presented at the Fordham Natural Law Colloquium on September 9,
2004, held at Fordham University School of Law.
** Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; J.D., 2000,
Harvard Law School; A.B., A.M., 1991, Harvard University. I thank Jim Fleming, Yong-
Sung Jonathan Kang, Eduardo Penalver, and Ben Zipursky for comments.
1. Professor Elshtain acknowledges that the traditional laws of war did encompass
the particular casus belli she considers moral, but the traditional laws of war as a general
matter were more permissive of war. It was only in the twentieth century that interna-
tional law moved to broad prohibitions of war, making lawful wars the rare exception,
rather than recognizing war as a sovereign right. See Leslie C. Green, What Is - Why Is
There - the Law of War?., in ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAw OF WAR 1, 2-5 (2d ed. 1999).
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tions;"2 or pursuant to a determination by the U.N. Security
Council of "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression,"' and Security Council authoriza-
tion of the use of force "to maintain or restore international
peace and security."4 Thus, modern international law would
seem to foreclose preemptive wars in advance of armed attack
and humanitarian interventions lacking Security Council autho-
rizations. Although just war theorists have argued the morality
of limited subsets of both sorts of formally unlawful wars, Profes-
sor Elshtain's concern in her lecture, and mine in this Essay, is
with humanitarian interventions that are seemingly unlawful
under the U.N. Charter regime, for instance, because of a lack of
Security Council preauthorization.5
In a nutshell, Professor Elshtain's argument is that we are
morally justified6 in fighting such wars notwithstanding formal
illegality. She applies her argument to a specific case: we, as
citizens of the United States but more importantly as human be-
ings, were morally justified in waging war against Saddam Hus-
sein inasmuch as it was and continues to be a war of humanita-
rian intervention on behalf of the Iraqi people, regardless of
whether the Security Council authorized the war or not.7
Moral justification inheres in the fact that "[o] ur morally
inscribed natures are offended when we see people systemati-
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The self-defense right has a sunset provision: "until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to restore international peace and secur-
ity."
3. Id. art. 39.
4. Id. art. 42.
5. The U.S.-led intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO")
in Kosovo is viewed as the leading example of this sort of unlawful but morally legiti-
mate use of armed force. See generally Jonathan I. Charney et al., Editorial Comments:
NATO's Kosovo Intervention, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 824, 824-62 (1999).
6. By "justified" I mean simply "permitted," but it may be that she would argue that
we are morally obligated to wage such wars. I should say that, notwithstanding my disa-
greement with Professor Elshtain in this response, I share with her the belief that we,
the United States, are morally obligated to wage wars of humanitarian intervention that
are duly authorized by the Security Council. This moral obligation is not necessarily
grounded in the Christian just war tradition, nor do I believe the obligation extends to
other Nations that lack the sort of military power and logistical capacity to execute
successful humanitarian interventions.
7. For the purposes of this Essay, I will avoid debate about the validity of resting
moral legitimacy on a largely post hoc justification for the war. The principal justifica-
tion articulated at the time the war began was preemptive defense on the since-discred-
ited theory of Saddam's possession of weapons of mass destruction.
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cally ill-dignified."' To fight for innocent human beings, our na-
ture-neighbors, when they cannot fight for themselves against
"systematic, egregious, and continuing harm,"9 is to give effect to
what Augustine of Hippo called caritas. We might now call that
virtue "charity" or "empathy;" Professor Elshtain's pitch-perfect
rendition is "neighbor regard." 10 Caritas is in our nature, indeed
' it is our nature, and to act even by means of violence because of
it cannot transgress natural law, which is the only law that mat-
ters. 11
Augustine well understood, however, that human beings
have impulses that prevent us from realizing our natures. We
have ambitions and passions that drive us to violence of a more
sinister sort. Just as other-regarding caritas might (and ought to)
move us to fight to defend other humans who cannot fight for
themselves, libido dominandi,1 2 the self-regarding will to domi-
nate, can move use to fight out of a desire to bend others to our
own self-interest.13 But we ought not to use violence to get what
we want, to get our way. We should only seek to use violence to
help others.
8. SeeJean Bethke Elshtain, The Just War Tradition and Natural Law, 28 FoRDHAM
INT'L L.J. 742, 752-53 (2005) [hereinafter Elshtain, Just War Tradition].
9. Elshtain, Just War Tradition, supra note 8, at 753.
10. See Elshtain, Just War Tradition, supra note 8, at 753-54. As Professor Elshtain
points out, the Christian just war tradition is an incredibly rich and complex one, with
subtle differences and refinements among key medieval thinkers such as Aquinas,
Molina, Suarez, Vazquez, and Vitoria. It would be misleading to claim too much uni-
queness in Augustine's thought, but it seems to me fair to say that he, more than any
other writers in the Christian just war tradition, was concerned about the internal dispo-
sition of right mind or intentions, by contrast, for example, to the object pursued in the
Thomist sense. Given the limited scope of this Essay, I will take Professor Elshtain's
lead in focusing on Augustine's writings on the subject, which, along with the work of
St. Ambrose of Milan, are the foundational works of the Christian just war tradition. To
be sure, both, but especially Augustine, were deeply influenced by Greek and Roman
thought on the topic.
11. See Elshtain, Just War Tradition, supra note 8, at 754-55. Professor Elshtain is
careful to qualify that "a 'natural law' and a stipulated absolutely clear-cut 'policy
choice'" are not "linked together inexorably." Id. at 755. I take her to mean that even
if one were to agree in principle on the morality of a theoretical act of force for human-
itarian ends, there are prudential factors such as whether one has the military capacity
to make a difference, that policymakers must take into consideration before making the
decision to employ force in a particular case.
12. Augustine sometimes uses the word cupiditas as a synonym for the libido domi-
nandi; in other contexts, cupiditas seems to refer to a blameless want or desire - a
neutral condition that might evolve into libido.
13. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Why Augustine? Why Now?, 52 CATH. U. L. REv. 283,
293-94 (2003) [hereinafter Elshtain, Why Augustine?].
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For this reason, the war of self-defense, unexceptionably lawful
under the U.N. Charter regime, is interestingly problematic in
Augustine's thought, perhaps more so than he lets on in City of
God, his magnum opus. 4 To see why, let us start from the simple
case of individual self-defense: is it just to kill someone who
seeks to kill or rape you? In Augustine's time, as today, it was
certainly lawful to kill in self-defense. But for Augustine, the an-
swer to whether it would be morally just to kill is "no," because
the act of killing in such an instance is motivated by libido, the
desire to preserve one's own life or bodily integrity and contrary
to caritas, Christian charity in the "turn the other cheek" sense,
orregard for the well-being of the assailant, a fellow human be-
ing. He writes:
Perhaps one might doubt whether life is somehow taken from
the soul when the body is slain. But if it can be taken away, it
is of little value; and if it cannot, there is nothing to fear. As
for chastity, who would doubt that it is located in the soul
itself, since it is a virtue? So it cannot be taken away by a
violent assailant. ... I don't blame the law that allows such
people to be killed; but I can't think of any way to defend
those who do the killing .... [T]hey are condemned by a
more powerful, hidden law .... How can they be free of sin
in the eyes of that law, when they are defiled with human
blood for the sake of things that ought to be held in con-
tempt? 15
Augustine, however, does not go so far as to claim that it would
be unjust for a soldier to kill an enemy in a war of national self-
defense.
A soldier who kills the enemy is acting as an agent of the law,
so he can easily perform his duty without [libido]. Further-
more, the law itself, which was established with a view to pro-
tecting the people, cannot be accused of any [libido] ...
Therefore, the law that commands that enemy forces be re-
pulsed by an equal force for the protection of the citizens can
14. See generally AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS (R.W. Dyson ed.
& trans., 1998). This is unsurprising given that City of God implicitly takes a favorable
view of the Roman empire (safely Christianized by Augustine's time in the wake of the
Emperor Julian's failed apostasy) and its historical wars of expansion on a capacious
theory of self-defense. The specific aim of City of God was to defend Christianity from
accusations that it had enervated Rome's ability to defend itself against Alaric and the
Visigoths, who in 410 sacked the eternal, if not Godly, city.
15. AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL 9 (Thomas Williams trans., 1993).
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be obeyed without [libido].16
Augustine's reasoning is admittedly thin here, but we can readily
intuit the missing step. A soldier who fights and kills is fighting
not for self, but for those citizens within his State too weak or
helpless to fight for themselves. His act of killing is, so it goes,
an act of caritas not libido.
But it is not so easy to agree that the soldier's killing in na-
tional self-defense is necessarily an act of caritas and not libido.
The soldier fights not merely to protect the dignity of other
human beings, but on behalf of specific human beings - broth-
ers, daughters, fathers, mothers, sisters, sons, wives, friends, and
co-citizens - people in whose survival he has a personal, selfish
stake. But on this logic, the moral case for wars of humanitarian
intervention seems even more compelling: in such wars, the sol-
dier's personal stake is diminished and the motivation is a purer
form of other-regard.
Of course, when a Nation with sufficient military force, such
as the United States, wages a war of humanitarian intervention,
we are confronted with a State act, not an individual act. But
neither Professor Elshtain nor just war theorists generally draw a
distinction based on that fact.17 Rather, they import wholesale
the centrality of right motives in judging the justness of State-
waged war. And if we are to accept the specific anthropomor-
phism presumed by the Augustinian just war tradition, the cru-
cial question is whether the Nation that seeks to intervene is act-
ing out of genuine other-interest, caritas, or self-interest, libido.
In practice, as the example of the individual soldier fighting
for national self-defense illustrates, it will often be difficult to as-
certain whether a Nation has the right intentions when it inter-
venes for humanitarian reasons. As in the U.S.-in-Iraq case, it is
more likely than not that a typical case for potential humanita-
rian intervention today will implicate a mixture of other-regard-
ing and self-regarding interests. To be faithful to Augustine, it
seems necessary, even in light of this admixture, to determine
16. See id. at 8-9.
17. I have elsewhere expressed doubt about the validity of such anthropomor-
phisms. See Thomas H. Lee, International Law, International Relations Theory, and Preemp-
tive War: The Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 154-55
(2004) (challenging normative justifications of sovereign equality based on human
equality).
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whether the use of force in such an instance is motivated more
by caritas than libido.
This, however, is well-nigh impossible. The leaders of a Na-
tion seeking to intervene primarily to advance self-regarding in-
terests will never be so forthright to admit to the use of force in
naked self-interest: humanitarian ends would surely be supplied
as pretext. Accordingly, it is unlikely that we can ever discern
real motives. How, then, to solve the puzzle of right intentions
posed by the Augustinian just war framework?
The first step to a solution is to recognize that it is futile to
look solely to statements of humanitarian motive; what is needed
is an external check that filters out pretext. This is precisely
what the current U.N. Charter regime on the use of force accom-
plishes in a crude and possibly unintended way. An authoriza-
tion of armed force for humanitarian ends requires the concur-
rence of all five permanent members and the affirmative votes of
nine members of the fifteen-member Security Council.18
To be sure, how a member votes will not be couched in
terms of evaluations of caritas or libido as the motive of the desir-
ous intervenor, but a member's pragmatic incentives to vote may
align with the Augustinian inquiry. If one powerful Nation (a
permanent member) stands to gain disproportionately from a
humanitarian intervention, there is a stronger likelihood that
other permanent members will veto the action. In this way, self-
interest checks self-interest. But the requirement of unanimity is
not just about power politics: if the aspiring intervenor is really
acting out of caritas, the sentiment is more likely to be universally
shared, and no one should object. The end result may be unfor-
tunate in the greater risk that truly selfless interventions might
be falsely identified as selfish ones, but this is a risk we should be
prepared to take if we are to take seriously Augustine's directive
to extinguish libido.
Applying this intuition to the U.S.-in-Iraq case leads to one
of two possible conclusions. First, one could say that the lack of
U.N. Security Council preauthorization is strong prima facie evi-
dence of pretext - libido masquerading as caritas, and so the
United States should be anxious about the possibility that the
war is unjust under an Augustinian standard, regardless of inter-
national legality. Second, one might conclude that, contrary to
18. See U.N. CHARTER art. 23.
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Professor Elshtain's initial premise, it is not the case that the in-
ternational laws of war preclude just wars; rather, it is plausible
to understand the current laws as a pragmatic instantiation of
Augustinian just war concerns given the absence of a means to
ascertain true intentions. Either way, the apparent restraints of
formal legality might be viewed as consistent with, not antitheti-
cal to, the Augustinian just war tradition.
In the end, there is very little in Professor Elshtain's schol-
arly (yet accessible) exposition of Augustinian thought with
which I disagree. My point, rather, is that her attempt to bring
his wisdom to bear on the current laws and policies of war misses
a crucial insight of Augustine's which the existing laws of war,
perhaps unwittingly, address. Augustine cherished caritas and
saw it as a reason (indeed the only reason) for the just war. But
at the same time, he was wary of libido and its power to foment
the unjust war. It seems prudent today to take heed of both the
exhortation and the admonition.
